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Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or
public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off
between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service
provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant
determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency
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T h el a s tt w e n t y - ﬁve years has seen intense debate about whether the private sector can
provide a variety of public services more eﬀectively than the government. The debate has
touched on services ranging from education, healthcare and transportation to trash collection
and street repair. In addition to the normative question of what role government should
assume in providing services, it has also raised the positive question of what determines
government privatization decisions in practice.
There are at least two accounts of government privatization decisions. One view, which
focuses on transaction costs, looks by analogy to the private sector “make or buy” decision
(e.g. Williamson, 1985; Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this account, privatization is
dictated by eﬃciency considerations. An alternative view, advanced by Boycko, Shleifer and
Vishny (1996) among others, emphasizes the private beneﬁts to politicians of keeping service
provision inside the government. This view holds that privatization tends to occur only in
response to external pressure such as citizen discontent or tight budgets. An analogous
account of the private sector would emphasize the private beneﬁts of control that accrue to
managers, and the role of shareholders in disciplining managers.
In this paper, we study the determinants of privatization at the level of U.S. city govern-
ment. City government is a useful level at which to study privatization for several reasons.
First, we observe many cities making decisions about service provision in parallel; in this
sense cities are a useful laboratory for making statistical comparisons. Second, cities provide
a wide range of services: from mundane services such as street repair and trash collection to
complex services such as law enforcement and education. Third, cities diﬀer in a variety of
interesting ways – by size, location, economic conditions and form of government. Finally,
local government service provision is important from both an economic and public policy
standpoint. Local government spending (counties and cities) equals about one percent of
GDP in the United States, so there are potentially large gains to be realized from eﬃciency
improvements.
We start by developing a simple model of procurement in which a government must
arrange delivery of a service from an agent. The government can write a contract that
speciﬁes the time the agent must spend on the job and a set of performance requirements.
We assume that specifying and enforcing a time requirement has minimal cost, but that there
are non-trivial costs to establishing and maintaining a set of performance requirements.
Provided the government cares only about what is actually delivered, we show that an
1optimal contract must take one of two forms. The government either pays the agent for
meeting a minimal time requirement or for meeting a performance requirement, but not
both. We view these forms of contracting as capturing, in a rough way, the two most common
ways that governments provide services: inhouse provision using salaried city employees and
performance requirements contracts with private sector ﬁrms.
In our model, governments face a choice between inhouse provision, which is ineﬃcient due
to the low incentives of employees, and the costs of specifying and implementing performance
requirements for an external supplier. This leads to predictions about how privatization
decisions will vary across services. Services for which it is harder to write, monitor or adjust
p e r f o r m a n c es t a n d a r d sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob ep r o v i d e di n h o u s e . T h es a m ew i l lb et r u eo f
services for which city administrators are more sensitive to the ultimate quality provided.
We also argue that the trade-oﬀ identiﬁed in the model will play out diﬀerently across
cities. For instance, cities may need to be a certain size to produce a given service inhouse
with any sort of eﬃciency. Moreover, if the relevant city administrator is more politically
motivated, he or she may place more emphasize on the beneﬁts provided by supplying a
service well (e.g. from higher quality service or from satisfying the demands of a union) and
less on the costs of service provision. We show that this will lead to less privatization.
We use the theoretical model to motivate an empirical analysis of privatization by
U.S. cities. Our empirical work makes use of survey data collected by the International
City/County Management Association (ICMA). The data documents how a set of just over
a thousand U.S. cities provide a range of services, from public works and transportation
(road construction, street cleaning, residential and commercial waste collection), to safety
(ﬁre, police, emergency services), health and human services, parks and recreation, cultural
programs and administrative support functions. Over eighty percent of services are provided
either inhouse or through contracts with private sector ﬁrms. A smaller but still signiﬁcant
set of services is provided through contracts with other public agencies. We view public
contracts as somewhere between the inhouse and private contract extremes – for instance,
a substitute for inhouse provision for a city that is too small to provide a certain service
eﬀectively, or alternatively, a way to contract for a service while still retaining somewhat
more control over production than may be the case with a private provider.
We complement the data on service provision with data from U.S. Census and other
sources that describe city demographics, form of governance, political leanings, and so forth.
Of course, a central prediction of our theory is that diﬃculties in specifying and administering
2performance requirements are likely to reduce privatization. To quantify these diﬃculties,
we surveyed a set of city administrators, asking them to assess thirty city services along
a number of salient dimensions. We use this data to construct a measure of performance
contracting diﬃculty.
Our main empirical ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, services for which it is
h a r d e rt ow r i t ea n da d m i n i s t e rp e r f o r m a n c ec o n t r a c t sa r el e s sl i k e l yt ob ep r i v a t i z e d .T h e
eﬀect is substantial. A one standard deviation change in contracting diﬃculty is associated
with a change in the probability of being privatized of eight percentage points – that is,
a forty percent reduction in the likelihood of privatization. The relationship is greater for
larger and more urban cities, which presumably have the resources to use inhouse provision
and perhaps also a more readily available pool of external providers. Newer cities also appear
to be more sensitive to contracting diﬃculty, consistent with a view that governance in these
cities is less political, perhaps due to a smaller public union presence, and more focused on
economic trade-oﬀs.
We also ﬁnd that services that are less frequently provided, and which managers rank
lower in terms of resident sensitivity to quality, are more likely to be privatized. An inter-
pretation in line with our model is that for these services city administrators focus more on
the costs of provision rather than the beneﬁts.
In addition to the variation across services, our data reveal substantial variation in priva-
tization patterns across cities. For instance, cities in the western states are considerably more
likely to contract for service provision, both to the private and the public sector. A similar
pattern is observed for newer cities. We also ﬁnd a striking pattern in city size. The smallest
cities are the most likely to contract with other public agencies, perhaps to take advantage
of economies of scale. At the same time, large cities make the greatest use of privatization,
and are the least likely to provide services inhouse. As noted above, we also ﬁnd evidence
of political eﬀects. Cities run by an appointed manager, rather than an elected mayor, are
more likely to contract for service provision, although the eﬀect is relatively modest.
We ﬁnd some evidence of spillovers within cities in the use of private sector contracts.
Common wisdom among city administrators is that familiarity and experience with writing
and administering contracts lowers the costs of using contracts for any given service. Consis-
tent with this, we ﬁnd that after accounting for city size and location, cities are more likely to
contract for any given service if they have more experience with private sector contracting on
other services. To separately identify this spillover eﬀect from diﬀering city-level propensi-
3ties to privatize, we use an instrumental variables strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous
variation in the mix of services each city provides. We explain the empirical approach in
detail in Section 5.
The bulk of our analysis focuses on the determinants of privatization. In the ﬁnal sec-
tion, we provide some suggestive evidence on the relationship between privatization and city
expenditures. We document that controlling for the mix of services that cities provide, cities
that do more private sector contracting spend notably less per capita. Though we cannot
h o p et oi n f e rc a u s a l i t yg i v e nt h ea v a i l a b l ed a t a ,t h er e s u l ti sa tl e a s tc o n s i s t e n tw i t ho u r
modeling approach and suggests possibilities for future research.
Overall, our results indicate that a simple transaction cost based view of privatization
provides a useful framework for explaining local government contracting patterns, at least
at the level of U.S. city government. It is worth noting that our results do not allow us
to distinguish very clearly between the distinct sources of transaction costs that have been
suggested in the theoretical literature. In particular, when we try to separate out problems
with performance measurement, the potential for holdup, and the desire for control and
ﬂexibility, we ﬁnd our survey measures of these problems to be so highly correlated across
services as to be essentially impossible to disentangle. This suggests to us that trying to
separate these issues empirically is likely to be a diﬃcult task.
We view this paper as contributing to both the economics literature on contracting and
integration decisions and the public administration literature on city practices.1 In particu-
lar, our modeling approach draws heavily on Williamson (1975, 1985) and Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991), in particular Holmstrom and Milgrom’s idea that employment is character-
ized by the employer prohibiting the agent from certain tasks – that is, dictating what are
permissible activities during a contracted time. More broadly, we follow Sclar (2000) and
Warner and Hebdon (2001), among others, in taking a transaction cost-based view of local
government privatization decisions. In this line of work, the papers most closely related to
this one are by Brown and Potoski (2003a,b), who also collect an original survey with an em-
phasis on contracting diﬃculties. Our contribution relative to their work is the introduction
of a clearly speciﬁed theoretical model, and a richer set of empirical ﬁndings.
In terms of studying political variation across local government, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) use U.S. Census data to relate contracting patterns to government char-
1Our paper also relates to the broader and extensive literature on privatization, much of which has focused
on privatization at the level of national governments. The collection edited by Bailey and Pack (1995) is one
entry point to this research.
4acteristics at the level of U.S. counties. They emphasize that state laws restricting political
hiring or imposing budget constraints on local governments might aﬀect contracting choices.
To relate our empirical ﬁndings to theirs, we perform a similar exercise using cross-state
variation in state laws at the level of city contracting. We defer a detailed comparison until
Section 6.
2. Local Government Service Provision: An Overview
A typical city in the U.S. provides about 40 distinct services, ranging from public works
(street repair and garbage collection), to public safety (police and ﬁre), to animal control
and maintenance of public recreation areas. Many city services are relatively labor intensive.
Capital equipment required to provide services (e.g. police cars, ﬁre trucks) tends not to
be highly specialized to a particular city, although there are exceptions, such as municipal
libraries, hospitals or sewage treatment facilities.
City services are provided by a combination of city employees and private and government
contractors. Exactly what services a city government is responsible for providing often
depends on a variety of historical and institutional factors.2 Once provision is decided,
however, city administrators have some ﬂexibility in determining how best to provide a
given service. The city managers to whom we have talked all emphasize that both economic
and political factors go into their decisions.
There is variation across cities in the form of governance. The two most common forms for
city government are Council-Manager and Mayor-Council (other forms of governance such
as town meetings and direct ballot referendums are relatively rare). A Council-Manager
government consists of an elected city council that is responsible for city policies, and a pro-
fessional city manager, appointed by the council, who is responsible for administration. The
city council is generally prohibited from interfering with the city manager’s administration,
but can remove the city manager at any time. In contrast, a Mayor-Council government
consists of an elected mayor who serves as the city’s chief administrative oﬃcer and an
elected council that forms the city’s legislative body. Cities with a mayor may also appoint
a professional city manager, but the mayor has authority over city operations. Whether a
city government is headed by an appointed manager or an elected mayor, there is typically
2These can be quite idiosyncratic. For instance, the city government of Stanford’s neighbor, Menlo Park,
California, is not responsible for the city’s ﬁre department, which instead is run by an independently elected
commission.
5a hierarchy of department managers responsible for service delivery. Contracting decisions
generally are made by the mayor or manager together with the department head who bears
responsibility for implementing the decision.
The ICMA surveys provide a snapshot of how city services are provided. The 1043 cities
in our sample provide a total of 41,227 city-service observations. Of these, 60% were delivered
using only city employees, 20% were provided using at least some private sector contracts,
12% were provided through contracts with another public agency, such as the county or
an e i g h b o r i n gc i t y , 3 and 4% were provided by less common channels, such as franchises,
vouchers, or volunteers.4
As our analysis in this paper is purely cross-sectional, it is worth commenting on general
trends in city contracting. Despite many popular press stories about public school contracts
and other high-proﬁle privatization decisions, data from ICMA surveys performed at ﬁve year
intervals between 1982 and 2002 show little evidence of any aggregate trend in contracting
behavior. Ballard and Warner (2000) and Hefetz and Warner (2004) argue that decisions to
contract out services are balanced by decisions to bring contracted services back in-house.
Based on this evidence, we will adopt the view that the broad pattern of city contracting is
roughly stationary, though individual cities are adjusting on the margin.
3. Contracting for Services: Theory
We model the choice between external contracting and internal service provision as one of
contractual form, where we associate external contracting with the use of detailed contracts
specifying performance requirements, and internal provision with the use of salaried employ-
ees. This view seems particularly appropriate for local government service provision; it may
also be useful for thinking about private sector make-or-buy decisions, an issue explored in
more detail in Levin and Tadelis (2007).
The model establishes a sharp trade-oﬀ between productive ineﬃciencies that arise from
using salaried employees and the costs of specifying and administering more productive
performance contracts. This leads to a clear set of empirical predictions on which to base
3In some states, cities may also form partnerships to provide services. For instance, in California, two
or more public agencies may join together under a joint powers authority (JPA) to provide a service. Fire
protection in San Mateo is provided by such an arrangement. We consider this a form of public sector
contracting.
4These numbers sum to less than one hundred percent because for about four percent of city-service pairs
the method of provision is not recorded in our data.
6our empirical analysis. In this sense, we view the model as a useful advance over less formal
transaction-cost arguments.
A. Technology, Endowments and Preferences
A city administrator, or principal, wishes to procure one unit of a good or service from
an agent. The city administrator cares about service quality and the costs of provision. We
interpret “quality” broadly and say that output is of higher quality if it produces more gross
surplus. For example, the quality of street repair is higher if potholes are ﬁx e di nat i m e l y
manner. Similarly, police services will exhibit higher quality if there is a faster and more
adequate response to the various public safety problems that arise.
To capture the idea that the value of higher quality can diﬀer across cities and services,
we let s denote the administrator’s sensitivity to service quality. Sensitivity may be a result
of pressure from city residents or other political constituencies. If the quality provided is q,
the sensitivity is s and the costs of provision are k, the principal’s net beneﬁti sV (q,s)−k.
We assume that Vq(q,s) > 0 and Vqs(q,s) > 0. The latter condition means that a city
administrator with a high value of s is willing to spend more to secure an increase in quality;
that is, she cares more about service beneﬁts relative to costs. To guarantee a unique optimal
contract, we also assume that there are decreasing returns to quality, so Vqq(q,s) < 0.
For simplicity, assume that labor is the only variable input relevant for the quality of
service that is provided. Speciﬁcally, assume that service quality is given by the production
function
q =( ρ + e)t,
where t ≥ 0 is time spent on the job, ρ>0 is baseline productivity, and e ≥ 0 is the agent’s
eﬀort intensity (e.g. attention to detail, problem-solving activities, or physical exertion).
The agent is endowed with T units of time that can be allocated between working for
the principal and working in an outside competitive labor market. When working for the
principal, the agent bears a personal cost of eﬀort c(e) per unit of time, where c0,c 00 > 0.5
The outside job requires no eﬀort intensity and pays a reservation wage r>0 per unit of
time. The agent has preferences over income and labor costs. If he is paid w ≥ 0 and spends
5We treat labor intensity as a one-time choice, but this involves no loss of generality. If instead the agent
were to choose a complete time path of eﬀort, the convexity of c(·) would still make it optimal to work at a
constant labor intensity.
7t hours on the job at an eﬀort intensity e, his utility is
w − c(e)t + r(T − t), with 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
B. Contracting on Time and Performance
Following common practices in procurement, we assume that the principal can write
ac o n t r a c tt h a ts p e c i ﬁes two requirements: performance and time spent on the job. For
instance, if the principal wanted the agent to provide landscaping services, the contract
could specify performance requirements such as the frequency for trimming certain trees and
bushes, the amount of weeds allowed per square yard, and what composition of fertilizers were
to be used. Alternatively, the contract could specify that the agent spend forty hours a week
providing landscaping services as directed by the principal. While time and performance
requirements are contractible, however, we assume that labor intensity is not. This implies
that the agent will always have some discretion over how hard to work.
A contract therefore is a triple (b w,b q,b t ),w h e r eb t speciﬁes a minimum amount of time the
a g e n tm u s ts p e n do nt h ej o b ,b q speciﬁes is a minimum quality standard, and b w speciﬁes the
amount the principal will pay the agent if the time and performance standards are met.
We make an important, and in our view realistic, assumption that there are costs both to
write and enforce contracts. To keep things simple, we assume that the costs of specifying and
monitoring compliance with b t are minimal, but it is costly to specify and verify compliance
with a quality standard b q. For example, to meet certain quality thresholds several things
may need to be described in advance, such as lists of instructions and ex post measurement
procedures (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). Furthermore, to verify the delivery of b q the principal
will often have to rely on a certain monitoring and measurement technology that has its own
set-up and operating costs (Barzel, 1982).
We assume that to specify a minimal standard of b q, the principal must expend costs
equal to d(b q,m). The parameter m is intended to capture diﬃculties in contracting, such as
the diﬃculty of describing performance requirements ex ante or adjusting them over time, or
the diﬃculty of measuring and monitoring quality. Accordingly, we assume that dm > 0.W e
also assume that d(0,m)=0and de q > 0, so that specifying and monitoring a higher quality
standard is more costly, but there is no cost if no standard is speciﬁed. Finally, we assume
that de qe q > 0, so that for a given service each increase in performance standards comes at
increasing cost. This seems natural if specifying and monitoring basic issues is rather simple,
8but for reﬁned issues it is increasingly diﬃcult to specify standards and verify compliance.
(See Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, for a model that results in such a cost function.)
C. Optimal Contracts: Employment versus SpeciﬁcP e r f o r m a n c e
Suppose the principal and agent agree to a contract (b w,b q,b t ). If the agent intends to honor
the contractual requirements, he faces two constraints. The employment constraint states
that he must spent at least the speciﬁed amount of time on the job, t ≥ b t;t h eperformance
constraint states that he must deliver at least the speciﬁed quality, q ≥ b q. The following
result turns out to be very useful.
Proposition 1 An optimal contract either speciﬁes a quality standard or a time requirement
but never both.
The formal proofs of this and other results are relegated to an appendix. The intuition is
as follows. Because contracting is costly, it could only be optimal to specify both requirements
if it resulted in both the employment and performance constraints binding for the agent. But
if both constraints were to bind, then the agent could deliver the same quality at lower utility
cost by substituting eﬀort for time. As the principal cares only about quality and cost, he
would do better to drop the time requirement and lower the wage. Simply put, if the principal
speciﬁes the ﬁnal product b q, then telling the agent how to do the job can only increase costs
because without this direction the agent has the right incentives for cost minimization.
This result not only simpliﬁes the problem, but adds meaning to the contractual re-
lationship. Namely, an optimal contract (b w,0,b t) that speciﬁes time and not performance
looks very much like an employment relationship in which the agent agrees to spend a ﬁxed
amount of time on the job, does not expend excessive eﬀort, and cares little about what
needs to be done. In contrast, an optimal contract (b w,b q,0) that speciﬁes only performance
looks very much like a contracting relationship in which the agent has all the discretion over
how to allocate his time and eﬀort, and he is bound by the performance speciﬁcations of the
contract.6
D. Characterizing Optimal Contracts
6The view of employment that we adopt here is reminiscent of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), who
emphasize that employment is characterized by exclusion. In our model, a salaried employee is excluded
from working in the outside market during the contracted time b t, meaning that on the job he will do what
is desired, only at a low baseline productivity.
9Proposition 1 concludes that only one dimension of contracting will be used. Since quality
provision can be accomplished by either kind of contract, it is useful to specify the costs of
each contracting mode. The logic of Proposition 1 almost immediately implies the following
result:
Proposition 2 For any quality level provided, the payment to the agent in an employment
contract is higher than in a performance contract.
The intuition is simple. Because the agent’s choice of production inputs is constrained
under an employment contract, the labor cost of producing quality q is lower under a contract
that simply speciﬁes a performance requirement. Note that Proposition 2 states that ignoring
contracting costs, performance contracts will result in more eﬃcient production.
Accounting for contracting costs, however, implies that a performance contract imposes
additional costs that are not incurred if an employment contract is used. The optimal
contract will weigh the added contractual costs of using performance contracts against the
added beneﬁts of the increased labor eﬃciency and lower labor costs. Hence, we are interested
in how the optimal contract varies with the principal’s sensitivity to quality s and the
diﬃculty of specifying and enforcing performance standards m. Our next result provides a
characterization.
Proposition 3 If contracting diﬃculty m increases, the principal will be more likely to use
an employment contract, while the optimal quality may increase or decrease. If the
importance of quality s increases, the principal will be more likely to use an employment
contract, and optimal quality will increase.
The ﬁrst claim is straightforward: increased costs of specifying performance standards
will reduce the use of speciﬁc performance contracts. The second claim, that increased
sensitivity to quality will also reduce the use of performance contracts, is a bit more subtle.
It relies on the assumption that it is increasingly hard to specify and enforce performance
for higher quality levels, i.e. that d(q,m) is convex in q.
E. Relating the Model to Data
In this section, we describe the empirical implications of our model. We also discuss
how some simple extensions to the model can generate additional hypotheses that we will
consider in our empirical analysis.
10Before turning to these predictions, we address one preliminary issue of interpretation.
Our model focuses on the choice of contractual form, while we have data on the use of
contracting versus inhouse provision. Matching our theory to the data therefore requires us
to interpret employment, or inhouse provision, as a contract that speciﬁes time on the job and
private sector contracts as specifying detailed performance requirements. This seems to be
an accurate description of local government practice. In principle, however, one could have
“employees” who are paid on performance, or “contractors” who are paid on time. Lawyers,
for instance, often fall into the latter category. We view this as a potentially confounding
problem if one were to apply our model to make or buy decisions in other settings, such as
the private sector, but as relatively unproblematic for our current application.
Basic Predictions: Our model yields two elementary predictions about how contracting
practices will diﬀer across services. First, cities are less likely to privatize services for which
it is harder to specify, enforce or adjust performance standards. Second, cities are less likely
to privatize services for which sensitivity to quality is high. As city residents are the ﬁnal
consumers of services, and city administrators are ultimately accountable to residents, this
suggests that privatization should be less likely for those services where city residents are
more likely to react to quality problems.
City Size: While not directly addressed in the model, our theory can easily accommodate
the role of economies of scale. It is easy to see that cities may diﬀer in how responsive they
are to the trade-oﬀs in the model depending on their abilities to supply the service themselves
or on the availability of private sector. Some services may have a relatively large eﬃcient
scale, making inhouse production ineﬃcient for a small city. Small or rural cities also may
face a thinner market of external providers. This suggests a third prediction, that small
and rural cities, being potentially more constrained, may be less responsive to contracting
diﬃculties of the type highlighted by our model. In addition, to reach eﬃcient scale within
the public sector, it may be more eﬃcient for a small city to contract for employees from
another public agency rather than provide a service inhouse.
Contracting Experience: Our baseline model treats each city’s contracting decision for
each service in isolation. City managers whom we interviewed, however, emphasized that
writing and administering contracts takes practice, and that capabilities gained contracting
for one service might facilitate future privatization. In the language of the model, the
contracting cost parameter m may decrease with privatization experience. This suggests a
11fourth prediction: cities that privatize some services may be more likely to privatize others.
Assessing whether this kind of spillover is present is an empirical challenge; we explain our
empirical strategy in detail below.
Political Economy: A set of political economy predictions can be derived from the simple
trade-oﬀs highlighted in the model. When city administrators place more weight on the
beneﬁts of service provision relative to the cost, i.e. have a higher value of s, they will be
more likely to provide the service inhouse. A natural conjecture is that elected mayors may
have motivations that are more explicitly political than appointed managers. In light of our
model, this suggests a ﬁfth “level-eﬀects” prediction: that cities run by mayors may be less
likely to privatize services as compared to cities run by managers. Moreover, to the extent
that political concerns might cause administrators to focus on issues other than the economic
trade-oﬀse m p h a s i z e di no u rm o d e l ,as i x t h“ m a r g i n se ﬀect” prediction is that cities run by
mayors will also be less responsive to diﬀerences in contracting diﬃculties as compared to
cities run by managers.
The form of government is an obvious political distinction across cities, but several others
may be of interest as well, and give rise to similar hypotheses. For instance, cities that
were formed relatively recently may have less of a political infrastructure and perhaps less
public union inﬂuence. This suggests they may do more privatization. They also may
make decisions that more closely reﬂect current economic eﬃciency trade-oﬀs, making newer
cities more responsive to variation in contracting diﬃculties across services. Although it is
somewhat outside of the scope of our analysis, it is also possible that diﬀerences in political
ideology (e.g. cities that are primarily democratic or republican) might aﬀect contracting
choices.
Political Economy and City Finances: A ﬁnal conjecture that emerges from combining
the political view of privatization with our transaction-cost view is that a city’s ﬁnancial
condition may matter for its contracting decisions. In particular, the political view would
suggest that if cities are very constrained – for instance because they have a great deal
of outstanding debt – then they may be more likely to privatize to save costs. Moreover,
if ﬁnancial constraints cause administrators to focus more on economic considerations, our
model would then suggest that debt-constrained cities would be more responsive to contract-
ing diﬃculties.
124. Service Provision by U.S. Cities: Data
To study the procurement practices of U.S. cities, we compiled information from several
sources. Our primary data are the International City/County Management Association’s
(ICMA’s) 1997 and 2002 Service Delivery surveys. This data has been used in several other
studies of local government (e.g. Hefetz and Warner (2004) and references therein).
The ICMA sends its survey to roughly 4000 U.S. cities, with a response rate of about
20-25%.7 The survey presents city administrators with a list of 64 services. It asks them to
identify the services they provide and the method of delivery. These include provision by city
employees, contracting out to a private sector ﬁrm, contracting out to another public agency,
a combination of the above, and other less frequent forms of procurement. After combining
the survey responses from 1997 and 2002, and eliminating responses that are substantially
incomplete, we have a data on a total of 1043 cities. For cities that responded in both years,
we use the more complete or more recent response.
For each of these cities, we collected information from the U.S. Census on population,
area, county median household income, the ratio of the city’s long-term debt to its current
revenue, whether or not the city has employee bargaining units, and whether the city is part
of a Metropolitan Statistical Area.8 We classify cities outside an MSA as rural, and those
within an MSA as either suburban or urban, with the latter meaning that the city is the
main city in the MSA. We searched city web pages to identify the date at which each city
was incorporated.
From the ICMA, we obtained each city’s form of government – Mayor-Council, Council-
Manager, or the less common forms of Commission and Town Meeting. In addition, we
gathered data on state laws that might constrain city decisions – such as limits on borrowing
or restrictions on hiring processes.9 Finally, as a rough measure of political ideology, we
collected county-level voting data from the 2000 presidential election. Table 1 presents a
summary of city characteristics.
7The ICMA sends the survey to the Chief Administrative Oﬃcer in all municipalities with populations
over 10,000 and a random sample of one in eight municipalities with populations between 2500 and 9999.
Therefore smaller cities are under-represented in the sample. The response rate in 2002 was 23.7%. As can
be seen in Table 1, cities in the Northeast are under-represented among the respondents.
8The population data comes from the 2000 Census; the other variables from the 1997 Census of Gov-
ernments. The one exception is the presence of employee bargaining units, which we use as a very crude
measure of the importance of public employee unions in a city. This question last appeared in the 1987
Census of Governments, so that is what we rely upon.
9This data on state laws comes from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(USACIR, 1990, 1993).
13While information on city characteristics is readily available, it is substantially more dif-
ﬁcult to assemble useful measures of service characteristics. For instance, we are particularly
interested in how diﬃcult it is to specify and administer performance requirements for a
given service. To assess this, we designed an additional survey of 23 city managers. For
this survey we chose a representative sub-sample of 30 of the ICMA services. The survey is
available as an Appendix.
We asked respondents to rank each service along three contracting dimensions: (1) the
diﬃculty of measuring and monitoring the provision of quality; (2) how routine or unpre-
dictable the requirements of the service are; and (3) the diﬃculty in replacing contractors
due to speciﬁcity or lack of competition. For each question we standardized the answers of
each respondent to have zero mean and unit variance. We then averaged the standardized
responses to construct an average response to each question for each service.10
Although our model does not separate out these impediments to successful contracting,
the existing theoretical literature suggests that each of these variables might have an indepen-
dent inﬂuence on contracting decisions. In the next section, we use simple cross-tabulations
to document the relationship between private contracting and our three individual measures.
As the cross-tabulations will show, however, these characteristics turn out to be so highly
correlated across services as to be nearly collinear in multivariate regression analysis. There-
fore for the regression analysis we use a principal components approach to identify a single
“contract diﬃculty” variable. The ﬁrst principal component explains 84% of the variation in
our three survey variables. We call this component, which is very nearly an equally weighted
average of the three variables, contracting diﬃculty. This corresponds to m in our model.
In addition to asking city managers about contracting diﬃculty, we included a survey
question asking the city managers to assess the relative sensitivity of residents to the quality
of the thirty diﬀerent services. Again, we standardized the answers of each response and
averaged the standardized responses to obtain a measure of quality sensitivity that we refer
to as sensitivity. This corresponds to s in our model.
Finally, we used information on which cities provide which services to construct two
additional service characteristics. A number of city managers suggested to us that services
could usefully be distinguished by the degree to which they were (in the words of Palo Alto
10One might hope that the aspects to contracting we are asking about are commonly understood by
practitioners and do not diﬀer much across cities. Indeed the survey responses were highly correlated across
respondents. To convey a rough sense of the alignment of the responses, say that two standardized responses
are congruent unless one is above 0.5 and the other is below -0.5. Making pairwise comparisons between
responses concerning a given service on a given question, less that 15% were not congruent.
14city manager Frank Benest) “core to mission” – and hence identiﬁed in an important way
with city administration. To provide a measure of whether a given service is a “core” city
service, we calculated for each service the fraction of cities in our sample that provide it. We
then normalized this measure, denoted core, to have mean zero and standard deviation one
across services.
Our core measure captures what fraction of cities provide a service. We constructed an
additional measure to describe which cities provide a given service. To do this, we computed
for each service the average population density of cities providing the service. Again, we
normalize this measure, denoted dense population to have mean zero and standard deviation
one across services. The reason we include this measure is because there do seem to be
services that are provided almost solely by the largest and most dense cities. These services
include programs for the elderly, daycare and drug and alcohol treatment programs.
Table 2 reports provision patterns of each of the thirty services included in our contracting
diﬃculty survey. Both the frequency of provision and the method of provision range dra-
matically across services. Some services, such as police and code enforcement are provided
by city employees in nearly 90% of the cities in our sample. Other services, such as solid
waste collection are privately contracted over 40% of the time, and vehicle towing is privately
contracted over 80% of the time. The last part of the Table reports service characteristics.
These seem to square with common sense. For instance, the most diﬃcult service to contract
for is police services, while the easiest are utility meter reading and vehicle towing.
While our empirical analysis below focuses on the method of service provision, it is
worth brieﬂy discussing the question of whether a city provides a service at all. As discussed
in Section 2, it seems reasonable to view whether a city is responsible for providing a given
service as predetermined in investigating how the service is provided. This assumption seems
consistent with information gleaned from interviews with city managers, who generally have
to concern themselves with how to provide a speciﬁed set of services.
Nevertheless, given variation in the number of cities providing each service, it may be
helpful to convey a sense of which services are provided more frequently and which cities
provide more services. To this end, Table 3 reports results of a logit regression relating
w h e t h e ro rn o tc i t yi provides service j to city and service characteristics. As the Table
shows, there are a number of regularities. Larger and older cities provide more services, as
do cities in the Northeast. Cities in the western U.S. tend to provide fewer services. Services
for which contracting diﬃculties are greater are also provided somewhat less frequently – in
15particular, a one standard deviation increase in contract diﬃculty is associated with provision
by 6% fewer of the cities.
5. Economic Determinants of Contracting
We now turn to addressing empirically the determinants of city contracting practices. We
divide our analysis into two parts. We look ﬁrst at the economic determinants of contracting
behavior, then turn to political economy considerations. An observation in our data is a
city-service pair. We focus on city-service pairs for which the city actually provides the
given service, and for which the service is provided either inhouse or by contract with either
ap r i v a t eﬁrm or another public agency.
A. Preliminary Evidence
In our survey of city managers, we asked managers to assess each service on the basis of
three characteristics: the diﬃculty of measuring and monitoring quality, the need for ﬂexi-
bility, and the potential for holdup problems due to lock-in. We start with some preliminary
evidence on the relationship between private sector contracting and these separate charac-
teristics. Table 4 provides a cross-tabulation that shows how the amount of private sector
contracting varies with whether its score on each of the three contracting diﬃculty dimen-
sions is high (above zero) or low (below zero).11 Each service, and hence each city-service
pair, belongs to one of eight cells in the matrix of Table 4.
The main entry in each cell in Table 4 shows the fraction of times we observe a service
with the identiﬁed characteristics being provided via a private sector contract. Contracting
is roughly twice as likely for services that score low on at least two of the three diﬃculty
dimensions than for services that score low on zero or one dimensions. Table 4 also shows the
diﬃculty with separating out the three dimensions of contracting diﬃculty. Of the thirty
services, twenty-three of them score low on none or all of the dimensions. Only one or
two services occupy the remaining six cells. This strong correlation also appears when we
use continuous versions of the three dimensions. Consequently, we use our single principal
component measure of contracting diﬃculty in the statistical analysis that follows.
It is useful to provide some initial evidence on the relationship between our aggregate
measure of contracting diﬃculty and the method of service provision at the level of individ-
ual services. To do this in a way that controls for the fact that each service is provided by a
11Recall that survey responses are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one.
16diﬀerent set of cities and cities may be more or less inclined to privatize for reasons that are
city-speciﬁc, we separately regressed a dummy variable for each city-service contracting out-
come (inhouse provision, public contract, private contract) on city ﬁxed eﬀects and obtained
the average residual by service. We plot these residuals against our measure of contracting
diﬃculty in Figure 1.
Figure 1A depicts the negative relationship between contracting diﬃculty and privatiza-
tion. It shows, for example, that vehicle towing, waste collection and building maintenance
are all relatively easy to contract and often privatized, while the reverse is true of police,
ﬁre, emergency medical services and code enforcement. There are two notable outliers: legal
services and parking lot operation. The ﬁgure shows that it is relatively diﬃcult to write
a performance contract for legal services, yet they are frequently contracted out. A simple
explanation is that while legal services are frequently contracted out, the standard contract
for legal services is based on time rather than performance. Parking lot operation is rarely
contracted out, despite having low contracting diﬃculty. A natural explanation here is that
outside of relatively large metropolitan areas, parking lot operation doesn’t involve any task
that could be contracted. Once a parking lot is built, there is no need for an operator because
parking is free.
Figures 1B and 1C show the corresponding scatterplots for inhouse provision and public
contracting. Both are positively related to contracting diﬃculty across services, suggesting
that these may be the relevant options for diﬃcult to contract services. We explore this in
more detail below.
B. Determinants of Privatization: Basic Results
We use a multivariate regression analysis to quantify the relationship between city and
service characteristics and the alternative forms of service provision: private contracting,
public contracting and inhouse provision. We describe the choice between these alternatives
using a standard multinomial logit model. In this model, the probability that city i provides
service j using method k is given by:





where yij ∈ {Inhouse, Public, Private} is the method of provision and Xij is a vector of
city and service characteristics. We sometimes use city or service ﬁxed eﬀects in place of
measured city or service characteristics; our results are not sensitive to this substitution.
17Throughout the paper, rather than reporting hard-to-interpret coeﬃcients from the logit
model, we report the marginal eﬀects on the choice probabilities.
Table 5 reports results from our basic speciﬁcation that conﬁrm the two elementary
predictions of our theoretical model. An increase in contracting diﬃculty is associated with
a shift away from private sector contracting toward both inhouse provision and public sector
contracting. The shift is substantial. A one standard deviation increase in contracting
diﬃculty is associated with a forty percent decrease in the likelihood of private contracting
(recall that on average about 20% of services are contracted privately and the estimated
probability change is between −8.3% and −10.1% depending on the speciﬁcation).
We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between privatization and our measure of resident
sensitivity to quality. Note that an increase in sensitivity is associated with a shift away from
private sector contracting toward inhouse provision, but not toward public contracting. This
is consistent with the view that cities want control over the services that are more sensitive
vis-a-vis resident responses. A one standard deviation increase in sensitivity is associated
with about a twenty percent decrease in the likelihood of private contracting (the estimated
probability change is between −3.6% and −4.9%).
Another indication that cities may want to retain control over services that are perceived
as central is that services that are provided by a broader set of cities (i.e. “core services”) are
much more likely to be provided inhouse. A one standard deviation increase in our “core”
measure is associated with a twenty to thirty percent increase in the probability of inhouse
provision.
Finally, services that are provided primarily by densely populated cities are substantially
more likely to be provided through private sector contracts. Part of this result appears to
be driven by a set of services that are provided mainly by large cities and have something
of a “private good” nature (e.g. drug and alcohol treatment, daycare) and are privatized
frequently. One possible explanation is that for these services there is a private market in
addition to public sector provision, making private sector contracting relatively straightfor-
ward.
C. Determinants of Privatization: Scale Economies
We argued that diﬀerences across cities in their ability to deliver services, and in the
market conditions surrounding them, will aﬀect their sensitivity to the basic predictions
of our model. As indicated in the lower half of Table 5, larger and more urban cities are
substantially more likely to privatize. Cities that have more than ﬁfty thousand residents are
18about thirty percent more likely to contract privately as compared with the omitted category
of rural cities that have less than ten thousand residents. Similarly, cities in an MSA (Urban
and Suburban cities) are about ﬁfteen to twenty percent more likely to contract privately as
compared with the omitted category.
These results show that larger and more urban cities are more likely to privatize on
average. Our third prediction was that larger cities would exhibit a closer relationship
between mode of provision and contracting diﬃculty, both because they might have better
access to private suppliers and because they might be able to utilize economies of scale in
inhouse provision. To get at this, we consider an alternative speciﬁc a t i o nw h e r ew ei n t e r a c t
contracting diﬃculty with city characteristics. These results are reported in Table 6.
The negative relationship between contracting diﬃculty and privatization indeed is much
stronger for larger cities. For the smallest set of cities, a one standard deviation increase
in contracting diﬃculty is associated with a 7.6% decrease in the probability of contracting
privately, holding other city characteristics at their sample averages. The change is almost
twice as large for cities with populations between twenty-ﬁve and ﬁfty thousand (13.1%) and
populations greater than ﬁfty thousand (13.7%).
Moreover, strengthening the results from Table 5, these results are consistent with the
idea that large cities substitute from private contracts toward inhouse provision, while very
small cities that may lack the scale for inhouse provision substitute away from private to pub-
lic contracting. For the smallest set of cities, a one standard deviation increase in contracting
diﬃculty is associated with a 8.6% increase in the probability of public contracting, almost
all of which resulting from the decrease in privatization. For the largest cities, the 13.7%
reduction in private contracting divides into an 8% increase in the probability of inhouse
provision and a 5.7% increase in the probability of public sector contracting.
D. Determinants of Privatization: Scope Economies
Among city managers, contract administration is viewed as a specialized competency
that is not taken for granted. As discussed above, this suggests a potential for economies
of scope in private sector contracting. Cities that have experience privatizing some services
may be more likely to use the private sector for other services. Identifying this empirically is
subtle because we want to tease it apart from the possibility that some cities are just more
likely to contract privately for reasons that we cannot control for directly.
Our empirical strategy is to use what we consider to be plausibly exogenous variation in
the set of services that cities provide. Consider two cities, A and B, that provide an equal
19number of services and are observably equivalent but for the set of services they provide.
Both cities provide service 1. In addition city A provides a mix of services that are relatively
easy to contract, while city B provides a mix of services that are relatively hard to contract.
Our hypothesis is that city A will be more likely to contract service 1, precisely because
it gains experience with contracting due to its mix of provided services. This suggest an
instrumental variables strategy where we regress an indicator variable for privatization of a
given city-service pair on the number of other services a city privatizes, using the average
diﬃculty of services that a city provides as an instrument for this count.
To implement this strategy, we consider a linear probability model where the dependent
variable yij is a dummy variable equal to one if city i privatizes service j rather than keeping




yik + Xiβ + dj + εij,
where Ji is the set of services provided by city i, the sum on the right hand side is the
number of services other than service j that city i privately contracts, Xi is a set of city
characteristics possibly including the number of services that city i provides, and dj is a
service j ﬁxed eﬀect. We report both OLS estimates and IV estimates where we use the
average diﬃculty of services in Ji as an instrument for number of other services that are
privatized.
Table 7 reports our estimates, which are strongly consistent with the economies of scope
hypothesis. A given service is three to ﬁve percentage points more likely to be privately
contracted if a city privatizes one additional other service. The eﬀect is not negligible; it
represents a ﬁfteen to thirty-ﬁve percent increase in the probability the service is privatized.
The result resonates with the account of city managers that writing and administering con-
tracts with private providers becomes easier with experience.
6. Political Economy Determinants of Contracting
As discussed earlier, our model of privatization decisions suggests a role for political forces
in focusing attention on beneﬁts of service quality and away from costs of provision. We
have several variables capturing aspects of political economy, including form of government,
city age, region of the country, city debt levels and resident voting patterns. There is also
20variation in state laws that constrain city decision-makers, which Lopez-de-Silanes et al.
(1997) argue may be important for local government privatization decisions.
A. Determinants of Privatization: Political Economy
Recall our ﬁfth prediction above that cities run by mayors will be less likely to privatize
s e r v i c e sa sc o m p a r e dt oc i t i e sr u nb ym a n a g e r s .A sT a b l e5s h o w s ,t h i sp r e d i c t i o ni sb o r n e
out in the data. Cities with an appointed manager are more likely to contract with both the
public sector (by 1.5 percentage points, or 12.5%) and the private sector (by 2.5 percentage
points, or 20%). Supporting our other political economy “level eﬀects” predictions, younger
cities (incorporated after 1950) privatize about 25% more than older cities, and cities with
employee bargaining units privatize about 10% less than cities with no bargaining units.
There is considerable regional variation in levels of contracting. Cities in the West and
Northeast appear to behave quite diﬀerently from cities in the middle of the country. Cities
in the West are more likely to use contracts with both public and private sector providers. At
least two explanations have been suggested to us. One western city manager hypothesized
that people in the West look less to government to provide jobs and services, and hence
are more open to private sector contracting. An alternative explanation is that these cities
have weaker public unions, even conditional on our imperfect control for union presence and
hence there is less resistance to contracting.
We argued above that greater political concerns would aﬀect how responsive city admin-
istrators are to the economic trade-oﬀsi d e n t i ﬁed in the model resulting in a sixth margins
hypothesis. This hypothesis is explored in Table 6 where we re-run our main speciﬁcation
interacting contracting diﬃculty with city characteristics. The results are mixed. The neg-
ative relationship between contracting diﬃculty and privatization is much larger for newer
cities and for cities in the western states. The relationship between contracting diﬃculty
and privatization is essentially the same in cities with managers and mayors, however, and
also in cities that do and do not have employee bargaining units.
Our ﬁnal political economy hypothesis was that cities with higher debt burdens might
be more likely to privatize in order to cut costs. Our expenditure results in Section 7 below
suggest that private sector contracting indeed is associated with lower spending levels. The
estimates in Table 5 show that cities with higher ratios of long-term debt to revenue privatize
signiﬁcantly more than those with lower levels of debt. The latter ﬁnding is consistent with a
story that high debt levels constrain political opportunism by city administrators and force
them to focus on costs (i.e. in the language of the model, act as if they had a lower value of
21s).
The above results suggest an important role for political economy considerations in pri-
vatization decisions. One hypothesis we do not ﬁnd support for, however, is that heavily
Republican cities do more privatization. In fact, it appears that cities located in counties
that voted Republican in the 2000 presidential election are somewhat less likely to contract
with both the public and private sector. We are hesitant to make too much of the result,
h o w e v e r ,b e c a u s ew ef o u n dn os i g n i ﬁcant relationship using data from earlier presidential
elections.
B. Determinants of Privatization: State Laws
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that state laws may have important
eﬀects on local government privatization decisions. In their paper, they use U.S. Census data
to investigate the contracting decisions of U.S. counties, and ﬁnd a number of interesting
correlations. For studying local government privatization, however, the Census data has
several weaknesses. First, it covers only a small sample of services (either twelve or seventeen
depending on the year). Second, it does not distinguish between contracts with the private
sector and contracts with the public sector. Our results suggest that the distinction is
important. For these reasons, it is interesting to re-visit their hypotheses with our richer
city-level data.
Table 8 reports results from an additional multinomial logit speciﬁcation where in addi-
tion to service ﬁxed eﬀects and our usual city characteristics, we include as controls dummy
v a r i a b l e sf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo far a n g eo fs t a t el a w s .T h eﬁrst column includes only the laws
studied by Lopez-de-Silanes et al. The second column shows that these results are robust
to the inclusion of additional state laws governing ﬁnancial audits, clean government and
collective bargaining practices.
The results yield a mixed comparison. Similar to their analysis, we ﬁnd that states that
prohibit political activity by city employees and states that impose city debt limits have more
contracting of local services. Both ﬁndings are consistent with political economy arguments.
In contrast to their analysis, however, we ﬁnd that states that require a merit system for
hiring, that prohibit strikes by their employees, and that do not permit take-overs of city
ﬁnances all have less contracting of local services.
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. argue that a merit system should make cronyism more diﬃculty
and hence increase privatization, contrary to our results. Another possibility is that it simply
increases the quality of city employees making inhouse provision more attractive. Political
22economy considerations do not yield a clear prediction about whether prohibiting strikes will
increase or decrease privatization, so perhaps it is not surprising that we obtain contrasting
results. The fact that the possibility of state take-overs is associated with more privatization
is consistent with the idea that cities that are ﬁnancially constrained look more to the private
sector as a way to keep costs down.
7. Contracting and City Expenditures
The empirical analysis above focused on the determinants of city contracting decisions.
Ideally we would like to assess the consequences of these decisions as well. Although there
are plenty of case studies on individual privatization decisions (see e.g. Sclar, 2000 for a
number of such studies), there is no systematic data that allows a comparison of service
quality and costs of provision across cities that choose diﬀerent methods of provision, nor is
there broad time-series evidence on cities that have changed their modes of provision. One
thing we can do, however, is to look at overall levels of city expenditures and how overall
spending relates to the degree of private sector contracting across a broad set of cities.
We use data from the 1997 Census of Governments to regress per-capita spending on the
fraction of services that are privatized, controlling for city characteristics. The estimates are
reported in Table 9. The ﬁrst column contains no controls for the set of services that are
provided; the second column controls for the number of services that are provided; the third
column controls for the mix of services by including a dummy variable for each individual
service that is provided. Because our measure of spending is an overall city measure, rather
than disaggregated by service, each observation in these regressions corresponds to a single
city.
The results show a substantial correlation between privatization and per-capita city
spending. Cities that privately contract ten percent more of their services spend about three
percent less per capita. Given that on average cities provide forty services and contract for
eight of them, this means that changing one service from inhouse to private contracting is
associated with a 0.6% decrease in per capita spending. A causal interpretation is obvi-
ously diﬃcult, so we view this evidence as suggestive rather than deﬁnitive. It suggests an
interesting avenue for future empirical research.
8. Conclusion
23This paper has studied privatization of local government services. We develop a simple
model that emphasizes what we believe to be a key trade-oﬀ between the productive eﬃ-
ciency induced by performance contracts and the low costs of contracting associated with
employment. The model explains why contracting diﬃculties such as problems in monitoring
performance, the need for ﬂexibility, or a lack of a competitive market would lead to less use
of the private sector. It also explains why greater sensitivity to service quality might push
against privatization.
We use this model to interpret our empirical ﬁndings about the determinants of privatiza-
tion for U.S. cities. Using data gathered from a variety of sources, we ﬁnd that services that
are characterized by high “transactions costs” of contracting and services that are widely
provided by U.S. cities or are ranked high by city managers in terms of resident sensitivity
to quality are less likely to be privatized. We also provide evidence that contracting to
other public agencies appears to be largely a substitute for inhouse provision, rather than
an analogue of privatization.
Perhaps most importantly, we ﬁnd a substantial degree of heterogeneity across cities in
terms of their contracting practices. In particular, large cities are more likely to privatize
and appear more sensitive to the trade-oﬀsi d e n t i ﬁed in our model. We obtain similar results
for cities that were incorporated more recently, and also observe more privatization in cities
governed by an appointed city manager rather than an elected mayor. We also provide
some evidence of spillovers in contracting practices within a given city, so that privatizing
one service may make it more likely to do further privatization. Finally we oﬀer suggestive
evidence that privatization is associated with lower spending.
Our analysis leaves many questions open. For instance, our empirical analysis is purely
cross-sectional; it would be interesting to study the dynamics of privatization decisions –
for instance, to study whether economic shocks might drive privatization decisions. This
potentially could be done using our data. A more ambitious project would be to try to
assess the direct costs and beneﬁts of privatization decisions. This would probably require
measures of service quality, which is one reason evidence on this front has been limited to
case studies.
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26Appendix A: Omitted Theory Details
Given a contract (b w,b q,b t ), the agent chooses e and t to solve
maxe,t b w − c(e)t + r(T − t)
s.t. t ≥ b t (EC)
(ρ + e)t ≥ b q (PC)
Given our assumptions, the agent’s problem has a unique solution. It is independent of the
wage b w, so we can denote the optimal intensity and time as e∗(b q,b t) and t∗(b q,b t).
The optimal contract from the point of view of the principal solves
max(e w,e q,e t) V (et,s) − b w − d(b q,m)
s.t. (e,t)=( e∗(b q,b t),t ∗(b q,b t)) (IC)
b w − c(e)t + r(T − t) ≥ rT (IR)
where the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) states that the agent will allocate his eﬀort
and time optimally and the individual rationality constraint (IR) states that the agent prefers
to accept and honor the contract rather than not. This second constraint will bind for any
optimal contract.
Proposition 1 An optimal contract (b w,b q,b t ) either has the form (b w,0,b t) or (b w,b q,0).
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose the optimal contract (b w,b q,b t ) has b q>0 and b t>0.
If (PC) binds at the solution to the agent’s problem, then the contract (b w,b q,0) will result
i nt h es a m eq u a l i t yb q at marginally lower contracting cost. Alternatively, if (PC) does not
bind at the solution to the agent’s problem, then the contract (b w,0,b t) will result in the same
quality at lower contracting cost. Q.E.D.
To obtain quality q with an employment contract (b w,0,b t), the principal must specify





To obtain quality q with a performance contract (b w,b q,0), the principal must specify b q = q,
and the agent solves
max
e,t b w − c(e)t + r(T − t)
s.t. (ρ + e)t ≥ q.
The optimal eﬀort level solves c0(e) · (ρ + e)=c(e)+r, which is independent of q,s ow e
denote it by e∗. The optimal time allocation is t∗(q,0) = q/(ρ + e∗). To make the contract
acceptable, the principal must pay the agent
W(q|PC)=
r + c(e∗)
ρ + e∗ q.





Proof. The ﬁrst inequality follows from revealed preference. The input mix e∗, t∗(q,0) is
the agent’s least cost way of producing quality q,s oi tm u s tb et h a tW(q|PC) <W(q|EC).
The second inequality follows directly from the ﬁrst. Q.E.D.
The cost of implementing q is therefore
C(q,m)=m i n {W(q|EC),W(q|PC)+d(q,m)}.
T h ec o s tf u n c t i o nC(q,m) is the lower envelope of W(q|EC) and W(q|PC)+d(q,m).A
useful observation is that because labor costs are linear, the latter cost function will cross the
former at most once, from below, provided that dqq > 0, i.e. that the costs are contracting are
c o n v e x .T h i si m p l i e st h a ti fa ne m p l o y m e n tc o n t r a c ti st h em o s te ﬀective way to implement
quality q, it will be most eﬀective for all higher quality levels. The optimal contract quality
is the solution to the problem
max
q V (q,s) − C(q,m).
Proposition 3 If contracting diﬃculty m increases, the principal will be more likely to use
an employment contract, while the optimal quality may increase or decrease. If the
importance of quality s increases, the principal will be more likely to use an employment
contract, and optimal quality will increase.
Proof. Consider an increase from m to m0. The costs of implementing any quality q
with an employment contract are unchanged, but the costs of implement any q with a
performance contract are higher for m0 than for m. Therefore an increase from m to m0
makes a performance contract less likely to be optimal. The optimal quality could move
up or down however. To see this, suppose the optimal contract under m is a performance
contract. If the same is true under m0 and dqm > 0 then it is optimal to reduce quality.
On the other hand, if the optimal contract under m0 is now an employment contract, it will
involve an increase in quality.
Now consider an increase from s to s0.A s Vqs > 0 and the principal’s problem has a
unique solution, the optimal quality must increase. The increase in quality could change the
form of optimal contract from a performance contract to an employment contract, but not
vice-versa. Q.E.D.
28Appendix B: City Manager Survey
We conducted a survey of 23 city managers, asking them to assess 30 services along several
dimensions. A complete copy of the survey is available from the authors upon request. Here
we re-produce the four questions that we rely upon in the paper.
Question A: Measuring and Monitoring Service Quality
To evaluate performance, it is important to measure and monitor the quality of the
service provided. For each service listed below, imagine you were considering contracting
out the service. Assess how easy or diﬃcult it would be to measure and monitor the quality
of service provision.
Question B: Need for Flexibility
For some services there is signiﬁcant uncertainty about precisely what (or when) things
need to be done. Other services are more predictable, making it easier to specify in advance
what needs to be done. For services that are predictable there is a greater need for ﬂexibility
and adaptive guidance. For each service below please rank the need for ﬂexibility and
adaptive guidance.
Question C: Provider Scarcity or Lock-in
For some services it may be hard to ﬁnd qualiﬁed providers or to switch providers once
and initial provider is found. This could be due either to specialized expertise, specialized
or expensive physical capital, or the lack of a closely related private sector market. For each
service below please assess the ease of ﬁnding or switching outside providers.
Question D: Resident Sensitivity and Response
Problems with service provision may trigger a response from city residents. Residents
are more aware of, and more sensitive to problems with some services as compared to others.
For each service below, please assess the level of resident sensitivity to problems that might
be encountered in the provision of that service.
Following each question was a list of the thirty services, organized by category: Public
Works and Transportation; Public Utilities; Public Safety; Health and Human Services;
Parks, Recreation and Culture; and Support Functions. Respondents were asked to rank
each service on a scale of 1 to 5. For Question B, for example, a one meant “no need for
ﬂexibility”, a three meant “moderate need for ﬂexibility, and a ﬁve meant “strong need for
ﬂexibility”. Responses by each manager to each question were standardized to have mean
zero and standard deviation one as described in the text.
29Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
City Characteristics
59,904 185,683 1,115 3,694,820
Area (sq. miles) 24.71 47.34 1 607
1898 47 1699 2000
38,755 8,578 14,178 68,017
51.0 12.3 16.1 82.3
City expenditure per-capita (1997) 1355 1033 23 16003
Long-term debt/Revenue (1997) 0.91 0.78 0 6
Public employees union (1987) 0.43
Geographic Region East Midwest South West
0.05 0.31 0.35 0.30
MSA Status Urban Suburban Rural
Urban 0.21 0.49 0.30
Form of Government Mayor Manager Other
Mayor 0.25 0.73 0.02
Services Provided (all 64 services)
39.5 9.7 6 64
Inhouse 23.6 8.1 0 47
Publicly contracted 4.6 5.2 0 35
Privately contracted 7.9 6.2 0 41
Otherwise provided or not reported 3.4 3.3 0 28
20.6 4.6 4 30
Inhouse 12.0 4.6 0 25
Publicly contracted 2.1 2.5 0 17
Privately contracted 4.4 3.4 0 21
Otherwise provided or not reported 2.1 2.1 0 14
Service Provision (30 service subsample)
Sources: U.S Census, ICMA, U.S. Election Atlas, City Web Pages.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Cities (N=1043)
Population (2000)
County Median Income (1997)
Number of Services Provided
Year Incorporated
County % Republican (2000 pres. elect.)
Number of Services Provided# Cities
Service Providing Inhouse Public Private Difficulty Sensitivity Core Dense Pop.
Animal control 857 0.61 0.21 0.13 0.64 0.25 0.74 -0.44
Building security 721 0.75 0.02 0.20 -0.98 -0.74 0.27 0.30
Buildings and grounds maintenance 1003 0.62 0.01 0.30 -1.08 -0.38 1.25 0.04
Collection of delinquent taxes 584 0.40 0.39 0.17 -0.72 -0.61 -0.21 0.15
Commercial solid waste collection 558 0.32 0.01 0.43 -1.21 -0.22 -0.30 -0.20
Crime prevention/patrol 1021 0.86 0.07 0.00 2.08 0.93 1.32 -0.04
Drug and alcohol treatment programs 201 0.05 0.38 0.39 1.64 0.25 -1.55 1.67
Emergency Medical service 769 0.54 0.14 0.19 0.72 1.02 0.44 0.33
Fire prevention suppression 932 0.82 0.07 0.00 1.41 0.77 1.01 -0.16
Insect/rodent control 443 0.42 0.36 0.16 0.32 -0.18 -0.70 -0.36
Inspection/code enforcement 1013 0.84 0.03 0.08 1.47 0.24 1.29 0.01
Legal services 842 0.34 0.02 0.58 0.54 -0.85 0.69 0.16
Operation/maintenance of recreation facilities 974 0.72 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.30 1.15 0.04
Operation of daycare facilities 194 0.24 0.09 0.55 0.78 0.56 -1.57 2.27
Operation of libraries 632 0.56 0.29 0.03 0.34 0.42 -0.04 -0.03
Operation of museums 342 0.25 0.16 0.29 0.46 -0.10 -1.06 -0.47
Operation of parking lots and garages 411 0.68 0.03 0.19 -1.29 -0.74 -0.81 1.37
Parks landscaping and maintenance 996 0.69 0.05 0.18 -0.91 0.08 1.23 -0.03
Programs for the elderly 582 0.28 0.20 0.19 1.16 0.36 -0.22 1.28
Residential solid waste collection 750 0.47 0.01 0.33 -1.25 0.77 0.37 -0.19
Sanitary inspection 496 0.51 0.40 0.04 0.60 -0.22 -0.52 -0.05
Sewage collection and treatment 868 0.68 0.20 0.08 0.35 0.03 0.78 -1.14
Snow plowing/sanding 698 0.80 0.05 0.09 -0.40 -0.13 0.19 -1.34
Solid waste disposal 565 0.32 0.18 0.35 -0.40 -0.67 -0.28 -0.07
Street repair 1011 0.45 0.02 0.36 -0.31 0.31 1.28 -0.10
Street/parking lot cleaning 935 0.72 0.02 0.18 -1.19 -0.18 1.02 -0.13
Tree trimming/planting on public rights on way 939 0.42 0.02 0.39 -0.85 0.17 1.03 -0.06
Utility meter reading 727 0.78 0.04 0.13 -1.27 -0.67 0.29 -1.10
Vehicle towing and storage 596 0.09 0.02 0.81 -1.16 -0.28 -0.17 0.74
Water treatment 783 0.78 0.14 0.06 0.29 0.38 0.49 -1.16
Method of Provision Service Characteristics
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Services
Sources: ICMA, Levin-Tadelis City Manager Survey.Marg. Eff. s.e. Marg. Eff. s.e. Marg. Eff. s.e.
Service Characteristics
Contracting difficulty -0.061 (0.003) -0.065 (0.003)
Resident sensitivity 0.160 (0.006) 0.171 (0.007)
City Characteristics
Population 10-25k 0.043 (0.009) 0.048 (0.009)
Population 25-50k 0.058 (0.009) 0.064 (0.009)
Population >50k 0.072 (0.011) 0.080 (0.010)
Manager 0.014 (0.006) 0.016 (0.006)
Other form of government -0.012 (0.020) -0.013 (0.020)
Unions 0.016 (0.006) 0.018 (0.006)
City Debt/Revenue 0.005 (0.003)   0.006 (0.003)
East 0.031 (0.013) 0.034 (0.012)
South 0.007 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008)
West -0.031 (0.007) -0.036 (0.007)
Urban 0.005 (0.010) 0.005 (0.010)
Suburban -0.012 (0.008) -0.013 (0.008)
Incorporated after 1950 -0.065 (0.007) -0.076 (0.008)
County med. Income (10k) -0.011 (0.004) -0.012 (0.004)
Percent republican 0.000 (0.025) 0.000 (0.025)
Table 3: Provision of City Services
Logit Model of Provision of City-Services (N=31,290)
(3) (1) (2)
Additional Controls City Fixed Effects Service Fixed EffectsLow High Low High
0.29 0.35 N/A 0.12
11 1 0 2
0.25 0.06 0.16 0.15
21 1 1 2
Table 4: Frequency of Private Contracting
Holdup Potential Holdup Potential
Need for 
Flexibility
Difficulty of Measurement Low High
Low
HighPublic Private Public Private Public Private
Service Characteristics
Contracting difficulty 0.047 -0.083 0.069 -0.101
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Resident Sensitivity 0.000 -0.036 0.004 -0.049
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Core service -0.097 -0.029 -0.147 -0.045  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Dense population service -0.037 0.140 -0.062 0.177
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
City Characteristics
Population 10-25k -0.008 0.011 -0.006 0.015
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Population 25-50k -0.012 0.022 -0.011 0.025
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012)
Population >50k -0.018 0.063 -0.015 0.065
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014)
Manager 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.025
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Other form of government 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.016
(0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.023)
Public Employee Unions -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.012
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
City Debt/Revenue -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
East -0.042 0.026 -0.040 0.037
(0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015)
South 0.018 -0.017 0.014 -0.023
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
West 0.032 0.019 0.031 0.013
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Urban -0.004 0.035 -0.002 0.034
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Suburban 0.031 0.041 0.029 0.034
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Incorporated after 1950 0.038 0.056 0.036 0.048
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
County med. Income (10k) 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.016
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Percent republican -0.105 -0.028 -0.091 -0.044
(0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.026)
Additional Controls
Note: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of outcome.
  City Fixed Effects Service Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Table 5: Effect of City/Service Characteristics on Contracting
Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Private and Public Contracting (N=19,244)
(3)Service Characteristics
Contracting difficulty 0.065 (0.027) 0.008 (0.038)
Resident sensitivity 0.004 (0.008) -0.049 (0.010)
Core service -0.147 (0.008) -0.046 (0.007)
Dense population service -0.062 (0.005) 0.178 (0.010)
Contracting Difficulty x City Characteristics
Difficulty * Population 10-25k -0.020 (0.012) -0.003 (0.017)
Difficulty * Population 25-50k -0.014 (0.013) -0.056 (0.019)
Difficulty * Population >50k -0.029 (0.015) -0.061 (0.021)
Difficulty * Manager 0.010 (0.008) 0.002 (0.012)
Difficulty * Other FOG 0.007 (0.029) 0.000 (0.034)
Difficulty * Public Employee Unions -0.003 (0.008) 0.002 (0.011)
Difficulty * City Debt/Revenue 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.006)
Difficulty * East 0.022 (0.020) 0.023 (0.023)
Difficulty * South 0.009 (0.010) -0.028 (0.014)
Difficulty * West 0.022 (0.009) -0.039 (0.013)
Difficulty * Urban -0.026 (0.013) 0.043 (0.018)
Difficulty * Suburban -0.006 (0.010) -0.010 (0.014)
Difficulty * Inc. after 1950 0.003 (0.009) -0.023 (0.013)
Difficulty * County med. Income (10k) 0.003 (0.005) -0.015 (0.007)
Difficulty * Percent republican -0.003 (0.032) -0.003 (0.047)
Additional Controls
Note: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of outcome.
Table 6: Determinants of Contracting, Interaction Effects
Multinomial Logit Model for Private and Public Contracting
Public Private
City Fixed Effects 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
Scope Economies
Number of other contracted services 0.029 (0.001) 0.033 (0.001) 0.047 (0.016) 0.034 (0.010)
Number of provided services -0.008 (0.001) -0.008 (0.004)
City Characteristics
Population 10-25k -0.005 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009) -0.015 (0.013) 0.002 (0.009)
Population 25-50k -0.002 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) -0.016 (0.016) 0.007 (0.011)
Population >50k 0.009 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012) -0.022 (0.031) 0.016 (0.016)
Manager 0.010 (0.006) 0.012 (0.006) 0.002 (0.009) 0.011 (0.007)
Other form of government 0.014 (0.019) 0.010 (0.019) 0.014 (0.020) 0.010 (0.019)
Unions -0.011 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.011 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006)
City Debt/Revenue 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004)
East 0.016 (0.013) 0.018 (0.013) 0.000 (0.019) 0.017 (0.014)
South -0.015 (0.008) -0.013 (0.008) -0.009 (0.009) -0.013 (0.008)
West 0.013 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007) 0.015 (0.008) 0.007 (0.007)
Urban 0.013 (0.010) 0.013 (0.010) 0.003 (0.013) 0.012 (0.011)
Suburban 0.013 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) 0.005 (0.011) 0.009 (0.009)
Incorporated after 1950 0.033 (0.007) 0.021 (0.007) 0.029 (0.008) 0.021 (0.010)
County med. Income (10k) 0.011 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004) 0.008 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005)
Percent republican -0.009 (0.025) -0.007 (0.025) 0.005 (0.028) -0.006 (0.026)
(4)
Service fixed effects
Avg. contract diff. of 
other services 
Table 7: Scope Economies in Private Contracting
Linear Probability Model for Private Contracting of City-Services (N=19,244)
Avg. contract diff. of 
other services 





Instrument for number of other 
contracted servicesPublic Private Public Private
Clean Government Laws
State requires merit system -0.036 -0.021 -0.035 -0.021
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
State sets purchasing standards 0.015 -0.012 0.025 -0.008
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011)
State prohibits political activity by city employees 0.019 0.042 0.020 0.030
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
City officials subject to ethics code 0.003 -0.004
(0.006) (0.009)
City records open to public -0.024 0.008
(0.010) (0.014)
State prohibits strikes by public employees -0.008 -0.090 -0.015 -0.081
(0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.025)
City authorized to engage in collective bargaining 0.007 0.036
(0.005) (0.009)
State law permits short-term borrowing 0.022 -0.014 0.029 -0.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
State imposes city debt limits -0.010 0.065 0.001 0.068
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
State mandates balanced budget 0.018 -0.026 0.027 -0.025
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
State law authorizes "take over" of finances -0.043 0.087 -0.047 0.059
(0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.023)
State assesses property tax 0.060 -0.090 0.094 -0.057
(0.015) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015)
Law mandates independent audit of local accounts -0.022 -0.024
(0.005) (0.008)
Law mandates state audit of local accounts -0.017 0.005
(0.006) (0.009)
Note: Reported coefficents are marginal effect on the probability of public/private contracting.
(1) (2)
Table 8: Effect of State Laws on Contracting
Multinomial Logit for Frequency of Private and Public Contracting (N=19,244)






Financial Audit LawsCoeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
Degree of Private Contracting
Fraction of city services privately contracted -0.305 (0.122) -0.387 (0.122) -0.246 (0.122)
City Charateristics
Population 10-25k 0.119 (0.059) 0.094 (0.058) 0.059 (0.057)
Population 25-50k 0.058 (0.066) 0.020 (0.066) -0.060 (0.066)
Population >50k 0.100 (0.074) 0.051 (0.074) -0.041 (0.076)
Manager 0.012 (0.041) 0.004 (0.041) -0.007 (0.039)
Other form of government 0.093 (0.125) 0.108 (0.123) 0.085 (0.117)
Unions 0.047 (0.038) 0.034 (0.038) 0.004 (0.036)
City Debt/Revenue 0.061 (0.022) 0.057 (0.022) 0.094 (0.021)
East 0.316 (0.085) 0.313 (0.084) 0.364 (0.084)
South 0.136 (0.050) 0.134 (0.049) 0.179 (0.052)
West -0.021 (0.047) -0.003 (0.047) 0.050 (0.052)
Urban 0.017 (0.064) 0.018 (0.063) -0.015 (0.060)
Suburban -0.390 (0.051) -0.372 (0.051) -0.261 (0.051)
Incorporated after 1950 -0.291 (0.046) -0.252 (0.046) -0.106 (0.046)
County med. Income (10k) 0.131 (0.025) 0.141 (0.025) 0.119 (0.024)
Percent republican -0.681 (0.162) -0.687 (0.160) -0.846 (0.161)
Number of city services provided 0.009 (0.002)
Table 9: City Expenditure and Private Contracting
(1) (2) (3)
Linear Regression Model of ln(City Expenditure per Capita) (N=1043)
Additional Controls
Individual service 
provision dummiesFigure 1A: Contract Difficulty and Private Contracting
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gFigure 1B: Contract Difficulty and Inhouse Provision
Building security
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nFigure 1C: Contract Difficulty and Public Contracting
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